INTEGRATION OF THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES'
GEORGE T. ALTn&*

To give, yet not to give-that is the problem which fear of Aeath taxes has forced
down the throats of prospective decedents. Substitutes for testamentary disposition
in a hundred different forms have been the neniesis of legislators and tax administrators as far back as death taxes have been levied. A person may desire to leave as
much property as possible to his children, and to that end to diminish as far as
possible the death taxes that will be imposed; nevertheless, as long as he lives he will
want to keep the property for his benefit or at least under his control. Ground between these two desires, decedents have invented all manner of distosition inter
rvwos in which they have attempted to retain control. Often in their eagerness t
avoid the death taxes they have added a provision destroying the control which
under another provision they essayed to retain, thereby attempting to fool the tax
gatherer but in result fooling only themselves, or rather their heirs.
.For example, beginning with the 1924 Act the federal estate tax law has contained
a specific provision including in the gross estate property transferred subject to a
power of revocation, whether the power was exercisable by the decedent alone or in
conjunction with any other person; and the Supreme Court had occasion to decide
that this provision was applicable and valid even where such other person was the
beneficiary. 2 Obviously, a power of revocation exercisable only with the consent of
the beneficiary is no power at all. Its inclusion in a trust instrument is but evidence
of the absurd lengths to which persons will go in the attempt to avoid death taxes
and at the same time retain until death the power and benefit which ownership has
meant to them.
. That Congress was aware of the use of testamentary substitutes
is shown by the
fact that in the very first federal estate tax act, that enacted in 1916, it provided
for inclusion in the gross estate of transfers made in contemplation of death, and of
transfers inter vivos intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death. But Congress was soon to find that testamentary substitutes were of many kinds,
and that when one fell under its ax there was always another to take its place. In
SThe plan presented in this article was first outlined by the author in Combning the Gift and Estate
Tare' (1938) 16 TAx .N'em.-s 258. It was later developed in an address by him before the National
Tax Conference of the National Tax Association in San Francisco, October x8, '939B-A., ig2o, Universiky of Minnesota. Member of the California and Illinois Bars, practicing in Los
Angeles. Certified Public Accountant, California and Illinois. Advisory Editor of Taxes. Lectarer oa
fedeal taxation, Northwestern University, x933-1935, University of Southern California, 1937-1938.
Author of l,-moorcno -o FEXALt. TAxAnos; contributor of articles in legal and general periodicals.
'Helvexing v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (x935).
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1924 it added inclusion of transfers subject to a power of revocation whether the
power was exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person.
In 1926 it made conclusive with respect to transfers over $5,ooo to any one person, the
presumption contained in earlier acts that transfers made within two years of death
were made in contemplation of death; but the Supreme Court ruled this conclusive
presumption out as violative of due process.3 In 1931 the Supreme Court emasculated
the provision requiring inclusion in the gross estate of transfers intended to take effect
at or after death by holding that it did not apply to irrevocable transfers though the
income was reserved by the grantor for life In consequence Congress added a provision expressly including such transfers in the gross estate. In 1936 the provision

with respect to revocable transfers underwent similar elaboration. The Supreme
Court indicated that a power to alter, amend or revoke might not include a power to
terminate, 5 and so Congress added the word "terminate." The Supreme Court
further held that such a power included only a power exercisable by the decedent as
settlor, not one exercisable by him as trustee,8 so that Congress had to add the words,
"in whatever capacity exercisable." Again, the Supreme Court opined that the act
did not cover a power not reserved in the trust instrument but arising thereafter, as
where a trustee resigned and the decedent was elected in his place by the remaining
trustees;7 as a result, Congress added the words, "without regard to when or from
what source the decedent acquired such power." Like the heads of the hydra, every
time one form of testamentary substitute fell beneath the Congressional knife, there
were two .others to take its place. Were it not for the recent action of the Supreme
Court in holding that the transfer of property subject to reverter on the predecease of
the grantee was one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the grantor's death," Congress might now be lunging at another hydra head.
Because of this hopeless battle with testamentary substitutes Congress imposed
the gift tax, a tax on pure gifts inter vivos, as a fortifying complement to the estate
tax. It was first imposed under the Revenue Act of 1924, repealed in the Revenue
Act of 1926, and then restored under the Revenue Act of 1932. Since then it has
been continuously in force, the rates being approximately 75% of those imposed by
the estate tax.9 The states, which like the federal government have had to endure
the battle with testamentary substitutes, have begun to follow the federal government in the adoption of gift taxes. So far gift taxes have made their appearance in
Oregon, Wisconsin, Virginia, Colorado, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee and
California.
'Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
' Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931).'Helvering v. Hclmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (193S).
aWhite v. Poor, 296 U. S. 98 (1935).
'TWhite v. Poor, rnpra note 6.
s Helvering v. Hallock, 6o Sup. Ct. 444 (1940), overruling Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 39 (1935), and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935).

' Actually, because the estate tax is imposed on the entire estate without deducting the tax, while the
gift tax is imposed on the amount actually passing to the donees, the ratts of the latter tax are less than
75% of the former. Thus, for an estate of $t0,040,000 the gift tax is about 5o% of the estate tax. Mo.'rrGOMERY, FFDERAL TAxEs oN ESTATES, TRuSTS AND GImTs, 1938-39, PP. 370"371.
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The federal gift tax, and those of several of the states, are cumulative, that is, the
rate brackets applicable to the gifts made in any year are determined by setting such
gifts on top of the aggregate of gifts made in prior years since the start of the continuous imposition of the taxY' Thus, in effect, the gifts made throughout the
various years are treated as if made at one time. By this method there is prevented

avoidance of the gift tax by a spread of gifts over many years, and thereby the gift
tax, with respect to gifts inter vivos, is given all of the efficacy of the estate tax. Even

so, the gift -tax falls far short of the mark, for the grantor can, by evenly dividing his

gifts between gifts inter t'it'os and transfers at death, bring his transfers down into
much lower brackets than would be applicable if he made all of his transfers either
as gifts inter vir'os or as transfers at death. " It is the same result as that accomplished under the income tax by dividing the income equally between husband and
wife. As a result, the prospective decedent still has the problem of making transfers
inter ,i,,os without wholly removing his fingers from the property transferred, and
yet without leaving it within the reach of death taxes.
The suggestion is almost immediate that the gift tax and death tax be combined
into a single cumulative transfer tax. The scheme of the federal gift tax could be
used, with the transfers in the year of death, both inter vivos and at death, regard-d
as the final transfers. The rate brackets applicable to the year of death would be
determined, as under the present federal gift tax, by superimposing the transfers
made in that year, both inter vivos and at death, upon the aggregate of transfers
made in prior years.
Validity of such a scheme of transfer tax, combining pure gifts inter vivos with
transfers at death under one tax, is now clearm Moreover, if such a tax is enacted,
there is nothing to prevent inclusion of gifts made prior to the date of enactment in
determining the rate brackets applicable to transfers made after the date of enactmenL It has been held, for example, that property otherwise beyond the reach of a
state inheritance tax because beyond the borders of the taxing state could be included
for the purpose of determining the rate,13 and likewise th.it stores otherwise beyond
the reach of a chain store tax because beyond the borders of the taxing state could
be included for the purpose of determining the rate.' 4 It should follow that transfers
otherwise beyond the reach of the taxing act because made before enactment of the
act could be included.for the purpose of determining the rate brackets applicab!e to
transfers made after enactment of the act. From the standpoint of practical administration, howeimr, the gifts to be included for this purpose could include only those
made since the enactment of the gift tax. Discovery of gifts made prior to that time
1

his feature was not present in the federal gift tax adopted " 1924.
possible to calculate the rspcctiie portions of an estate which should be given away during
the owners life and retained until his death in order to produce the minimum combined gift and estate
tax. For a table illustrating these proportions for estates of rarious sizes, see MoxroszrY, FEn.EA. TAX=S
ov EsTrxs, Tx'srs A-D Givrs, 1938-39. p. 427. In an estate of $5,oooooo, the minimum rate is reached
when the owner retains $640,coo. The minimum combined rate is then 19.5% as against the estate tax
rate on the entire estate of 38%. Id. at 426.
'MaxweI v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919).
lHd-ering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1938).
1
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, joi U. S. 412 (1937)-
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would be impracticable., Considering both validity and practical administration,
then, the gifts to be included for the purpose of determining the rate brackets applicable under such a combined gift and estate tax could include the gifts made in
prior years from the beginning of the continuous imposition of the gift tax which,
together with the estate tax, it supersedes.
For example, suppose Congress enacted such a tax applicable to decedents dying
after December 31, 1940, and that a certain decedent died December i, i941. Suppose
further that the schedule of rates under the new transfer tax was the same as the
schedule of rates under the present federal gift tax law, and that the other provisions
of the present gift tax law were also embodied in the new law. Suppose also that this
particular decedent had made gifts in prior years totaling, after deducting the $4,ooo
exclusion applicable to each donee in any one year ($5,ooo with respect to gifts made
before 1939), and after deducting gifts to charities, and so forth, but before deducting
the so-called specific exemption of $4oooo-totaling, with these deductions, $4oo,ooo.
Now suppose that in 1941 he made gifts totaling, with similar deductions, $2oo,ooo
up to the date of death, and $4oo,oo in transfers at death. His transfer tax for the
year of death would be computed as follows.
Transfers at death: ....... I.................................... $ 400,000
Gifts inter vivos in '1941, the year of death ........................ 200,000
Total transfers in year of death.........................$
Transfers in prior years .........................................

6o0,ooo
400,000

Total transfers ............................................... $ ,ooo,ooo
Deduct specific exemption ......................................
40,000
Net transfers .................................................. $ 96o,o0
Tax on this amount under schedule adopted..: ............................

$158,250

Deduct

Tax under same schedule on total of gifts made in prior years:
Total of gifts made in prior years ............................ $ 400,000
40,000
Less specific exemption ......................................
Net gifts made in prior years .................................

36o,o00

Tax as computed under same schedule .................................

43,950

Tax payable on transfers in year of death...............................

$114,300

The same integrating scheme could be applied, with slight variation, to the state
gift and inheritance taxes, the rates of which vary according to the relation of the
donee or legatee to the donor or decedent. Under this scheme it is obvious that a
prospective decedent would have nothing to gain, as far as taxes on gifts and transfers
at death are concerned, by making gifts during his lifetime. It might, in fact, be
said that he would tend to defer gifts in order to defer the payment of the taxes and
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thereby to save the interest for the period of deferment on the amount of taxes
involved. This tendency could be counteracted by allowance of a credit against the
tax payable for the final year, of an amount computed like interest, at say 3 or 4%,
on the taxes paid for prior years from the dates of payment to the date of death.
The saving, however, that gifts inter vivos ordinarily effect in income taxes, by
dividing the income-producing capital and thus bringing the donor's income down
into lower brackets, might be expected to counteract any tendency to defer gifts
merely to save the interest on the tax amounts for the period of deferment. Perhaps,
then, any credit against the final tax on account of such interest lost where transfer
taxes have been paid in prior years might be disregarded.
In any case, it is obvious that with replacement of the separate gift and death
taxes by a single transfer tax the reason for all testamentary substitutes, at least as
far as taxes are concerned, will have disappeared. Transfers in contemplation of
death, transfers to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, and transfers with a power reserved, in all of their motley forms, with all of their gossamer
distinctions, that have fed for a generation the fires of battle between tax lawyers on
the one hand and tax administrators and legislative bodies on the other, that have
evoked from the courts a type of reasoning reminiscent of the seminars of the middle
ages, that have kept the fingers of prospective decedents quivering with the faint
caress of property transferred but still theirs, yet not theirs-all these will vanish
when the separation between the gift and death taxes is borne to its final resting
place.

